The 25th September is one of, if not the most costly day in French military history, with an estimated 23,664 deaths in the dual Champagne and Artois offensive. These horrifying figures, added to the losses of August and September 1914, highlight the terrible price the French Army paid and had been paying since the start of the war, who at this point had already lost well over 560,000 men.
The time set for the attack was 09h15, with the men in position by 8h45, with all officers’ watches aligned to time of the Eiffel Tower. Yes, you read that correctly, Eiffel Tower time, this is not a military term, as it dates from 1910, when the Eiffel tower started being used as a radio broadcasting signal and at that point the tower became part of the International Time Service. The purpose of this watch setting was to avoid any signal being used that may alert the enemy to an attack starting. The first wave of troops were equipped with 250 rounds of ammunition, light field pack, gas mask and white rectangles on their back packs as identification. Along the line the orders were simple: to make as much progress as possible before night fall, but to avoid entering trenches at all costs. This job would be left to the ‘nettoyeurs’ (trench cleaners) in the 2nd wave. In total twenty divisions of the Second and Fourth Armies attacked at 09h15. Initially gains were made along the 40km front with an estimated 14,000 Germans taken prisoner, but French casualties were extremely high.
The objectives for the 315e RI were clear, as the Premier Regiment, flanked on their left by 102e RI and on their right by 103e RI from 7e division with brigade commander General Ferrat in overall command. The 315e RI orders were to go on the offensive: Two waves of four compagnies, were designated to retake Auberive village. The initial signs were ominous, when 5e Chef de Battalion Capitaine Lucien Roy, who had been wounded by a badly fused 58’ on the 23rd September 1915 had refused to be evacuated so that he could take part in the attack. He demanded early in the morning an additional concentrated barrage (800 75’ rounds) on an area of barbed wire, which he could visibly see had not been cut, despite the artillery having fired well over 72,000 75’ shells and 13,200 90’ shells over 3 days prior to the offensive.
